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SMOKERS' CHANCES OF A FAIR FIGHT AGAINST THE TOBACCO
COMPANIES GO UP IN FlAMES: A STUDY OF PHILIP MORRIS
INC. v. ANGELETTI AND ITS EFFECT ON THE VIABILI1Y
OF CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS IN MARYLAND TOBACCO
LITIGATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The use of class action as a litigation device has proven to be the
most efficient and effective method of adjudicating certain kinds of
claims. 1 However, many courts at both the state and federal levels
have expressed great reluctance in certifying class action lawsuits involving mass tort claims. 2 Mostly because of the potential for predominance of individual issues, many courts hold that class actions in such
suits generally do not provide the most judicially economical means
by which to settle the claims. 3
Maryland courts are no exception. 4 Recently, in a four to three decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Philip Morris Inc. v.
Angeletti, 5 a class action tobacco lawsuit brought against several tobacco manufacturers and related companies. 6 Judge Edward J.
Angeletti of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City originally certified
the class action? However, because no statute existed in Maryland
allowing interlocutory appeal of a class action certification order, 8 the
defendants requested that the court of appeals grant the extraordinary relief of mandamus and order Judge Angeletti to decertify the
1. See Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace and Put Options in the Mass Tort
Class Action, 115 HARv. L. REv. 747 (2002) (noting that class action litigation is common in the areas of antitrust, consumer, and securities
litigation).
2. See In re Rhone-Polenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that most federal courts have refused to allow the use of class actions in mass tort cases); see also In reAgent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818
F.2d 145, 164 (2d Cir. 1987) (denying class certification and stating that
class actions are inappropriate due to the individualistic nature of the causation issues); Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 769, 752 A.2d
200, 244 (2000) (denying class certification based on a lack of a predominance of issues); Pollokoff v. Md. Nat'l Bank, 288 Md. 485, 501, 418 A.2d
1201, 1210 (1980). See also infra notes 4-12 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the court of appeals' decision in Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti.
3. See infra Part IV.
4. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 787-88, 752 A.2d at 1210; Pollokoff, 288 Md. at 501,
418 A.2d at 1210; Snell v. Geico Corp., No. CIV. 202160, 2001 WL 1085237
(Md. Cir. Ct. Aug. 14, 2001).
5. 358 Md. 689, 752 A.2d 200 (2000).
6. Id. at 699-700, 700 n.2, 752 A.2d at 205, 205 n.2; see also infra Part Ill.
7. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 699 n.l, 752 A.2d at 205 n.l.
8. See id. at 706-07, 752 A.2d at 210-11.
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class. 9 Generally in Maryland, an order certifying a class action is only
appealable on final judgment. 10 However, in this case, not only did
the court of appeals order Judge Angeletti to decertifY the class action
based on the extraordinary writ of mandamus, 11 the court of appeals
also explicitly outlined a myriad of arguments against the future use of
the class action device to litigate mass tort tobacco claims in Maryland.12 Based on the court's comprehensive denial of certification
and its unique use of the writ of mandamus to overrule Judge
Angeletti's class certification, this Comment argues that Philip Morris
Inc. v. Angeletti virtually extinguishes any future possibility that tobacco-related lawsuits will be successfully litigated in Maryland,
whether litigated as class actions or litigated by individuals.
In analyzing the Angeletti decision and its impact on Maryland law,
this Comment begins with a discussion of the original purpose and
historical development of the Maryland rule regarding class action
certification. 13 Part II provides a comparison of ~tie Maryland rule
with the corresponding federal rule and an explanation of the policies
behind and proper usage of the class action device as it is currently
applied. 14 Part III presents an overview of the facts of Angeletti, as well
as the analysis and rationale of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
utilizing the extraordinary writ of mandamus as a means of ordering
decertification of the class. 15 Part III also details the court's discussion
of Maryland's class action certification rule and the problems inherent in tobacco litigation that will likely eliminate the certification of
similar class actions in Maryland in the future. 16 Part IV discusses the
viability of class action certification for general mass tort claims in
other jurisdictions and the reasons for their success or failure as compared to the court's rationale in Angeletti. 17 In addition, Part IV details
the court of appeals' use of the writ of mandamus as a means of avoiding the final judgment rule 18 and offers suggestions to reduce the use
of mandamus in this way. 19 This Comment concludes that Angeletti
virtually extinguishes any hope for plaintiffs of successful litigation of
tobacco claims in Maryland, whether via class action litigation or otherwise, and warns potential similarly situated litigants of the court of
9. /d. at 699, 703, 752 A.2d at 205, 208.
10. See infra note 259 and accompanying text (noting that the Maryland rules
lack the interlocutory appeal provision available in the federal class action
rule).
11. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 699, 752 A.2d at 205.
12. See id. at 729-30, 752 A.2d at 222; see also infra Part III.C.
13. See infra Part II.A-B.
14. See infra Part II.B-C.
15. See infra Part liLA-B.
16. See infra Part III.C.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra notes 265-70 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part IV.D.
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appeals' ability to review and decertify such class action suits at
anytime. 20
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF CLASS ACTION IN MARYLAND

Even before specific rules were enacted defining class action as a
litigation device, representative litigation existed. 21 The earliest record of representative litigation in Maryland is the 1852 case of Negro
jerry v. Townshenrf2 2 in which two slaves petitioned for their freedom
on behalf of themselves and other slaves. 23 This case demonstrates an
early example of representative litigation because the plaintiffs represented the rights of others who were not named as parties. 24
In 1880, the Maryland courts explicitly recognized what they called
the "doctrine of representation" in Bowen v. Gent. 25 Under the doctrine of representation, the rights of unnamed parties were appropriately protected by the party or parties representing them if the
unnamed parties were affected by the ruling of the court and if the
unnamed parties had a common interest with the representative parties who appeared in court on their behalf. 26 However, courts hesitated to utilize the doctrine because they were concerned that each
individual claiming harm should be a party to the litigation in order
to ensure the protection of his interests. 27 The doctrine of representation was in contrast to the general rule that all those whose interests
could be affected by adjudication should be made parties to the action, unless doing so would be too difficult or inconvenient. 28
Over thirty years after Bowen and the introduction of the doctrine of
representation, the Court of Appeals of Maryland outlined the fundamental concepts behind what would eventually become the modern
class action rule. 29 In Leviness v. Consolidated Gas Electric Light & Power
20. See infra Part V.
21. See Ian Gallacher, Representative Litigation in Maryland: The Past, Present and
Future of the Class Action Rule in State Court, 58 Mo. L. REv. 1510, 1515
(1999); see also infra note 26 and accompanying text (describing the doctrine of representation).
22. 2 Md. 274 (1852).
23. Id.; see also Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1515-16.
24. See generally Negro jerry, 2 Md. at 274; Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1518.
25. 54 Md. 555 (1880). Bowen involved a series of claims filed regarding the
sale of land held as tenants in common. !d. at 556-57. The court held that
a co-tenant's interest was not properly represented in an earlier suit and,
therefore, he was not bound by the prior decision. Id. at 570-71.
26. See id.
27. See Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1518-19.
28. See id. The concept of inconvenience is today embodied in the goal of judicial economy. See infra Part IV.C. These concerns remain extremely relevant in modern class action litigation, especially in the area of mass torts.
See infra Part IV.C.
29. See Leviness v. Canso!. Gas Elec. Light & Power Co., 114 Md. 559, 567-68, 80
A. 304, 307 (1911).
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Co., the court held that the use of the doctrine of representation was
appropriate in the following situations:
( 1) Where the question is one of a common or general interest, and one or more sue or defend for the benefit of the
whole; (2) where the parties form a voluntary association for
public or private purposes, and those who sue or defend may
fairly be presumed to represent the rights and interests of
the whole; (3) where the parties are very numerous and
though they have or may have separate and distinct interests,
yet it is impractical to bring them all before the Court. 30
As outlined in Leuiness, the doctrine of representation resembles
the modern class action device in some ways. 31 Both require that the
representative plaintiff adequately represent the rights and claims of
the other plaintiffs, 32 that the representative plaintiff have interests in
common with the other plaintiffs, 33 and that the number of plaintiffs
represented be large enough such that individual litigation would be
inefficient or impractical. 34
While this comparison shows that efficiency, or judicial economy,
has always been an element of representative litigation, arguably the
litigation device also developed as a means of giving parties greater
access to the courts. Certain parties may have had access to the courts
through representative litigation based on the common law right
under the doctrine of representation, but Maryland did not codify the
right until 1961. 35
A.

Statutory Right to Class Action in Maryland

Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 36 ("Federal Rule")
codified the use of class action in federal court in 1938, Maryland had
30. !d. (quoting section 97 of Story's Equity Pleading). Concepts of the modern
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy are
each represented within the early rule. See infra Part II.B for a discussion
of the modern requirements.
31. See infra note 43 (quoting the full text of Maryland Rule 2-231); see also
Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1520 (noting that the doctrine of representation and the modern class action device also differ regarding notice requirements, use in equity versus law courts, and dismissal procedures).
Compare supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine
of representation), with Mo. R. 2-231.
32. Compare Mo. R. 2-231(a)(4), with Leviness, 114 Md. at 567-68, 80 A. at 307.
33. Compare Mo. R. 2-231(a)(4), with Leviness, 114 Md. at 567-68, 80 A. at 307.
34. Compare Mo. R. 2-231 (a) ( 4), with Leviness, 114 Md. at 567-68, 80 A. at 307.
See also FED. R. Cw. P. 23(a) (requiring that a class be numerous enough
that joinder is impractical).
35. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
36. Federal Rule 23 states:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
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class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and
in addition: (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against
individual members of the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect
to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties
to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests; or (2) the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or (3) the
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the
interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice; judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions. (1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision
may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the
decision on the merits. (2) In any class action maintained under
subdivision (b)(3}, the court shall direct to the members of the
class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A)
the court will exclude the member from the class if the member so
requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable
or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and
(C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance through counsel. (3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of
the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action
under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not favorable to the class,
shall include and specifY or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the
class. ( 4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B)
a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a
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no statutory right to class action until over twenty years later in 1961
when it adopted Rule 209. 37 Perhaps because Rule 209 was not as
class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and
applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to
which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: ( 1)
determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to
prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of
evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the
members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to
some or all of the members of any step in the action or of the
proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise
to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; ( 4) requiring that the pleadings be
amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of
absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined
with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as
may be desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of
the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
(f) Appeals. A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying class action certification under this rule if application is made to it within
ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of
appeals so orders.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
37. Maryland Rule 209 stated:
a. When Allowed. When there is a question of law or fact common
to persons of a numerous class whose joinder is impracticable, one
or more of them whose claims or defenses are representative of the
claims or defenses of all and who will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of all may sue or be sued on behalf of all.
b. Elimination of Representative Character. Except where a class action is maintained of right, the court may adjudicate and declare
the non-representative character of the action and render judgment specifically determining that only the parties to the action are
bound thereby.
c. Protective Orders-Notice. The court at any stage of the action may
impose such terms as shall fairly and adequately protect the interests of the persons on whose behalf the action is brought or defended, including an order that notice be given in such a manner
as it may direct: (1) of the pendency of the action, (2) of a proposed settlement, (3) of rendition of judgment, (4) to come in and
present claims, or (5) of any other proceedings in the action.
d. Court Approval for Compromise or Dismissal. Except with the approval of the court, a class action shall not be compromised or
dismissed.
Mo. R. 209 (1961) (repealed 1984).
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instructive as the federal rule, the Maryland courts often referred to
federal class action cases when deciding certain issues. 38
In johnson v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 39 the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland looked for guidance in interpreting its own class action statute and followed the United States Supreme Court case of Eisen v.
Carlisle & jacquelin. 40 In following Eisen, the court in johnson held that
the class should incur the cost of providing notice to class members
and that the trial court should not inquire into the merits of the litigation during the class certification phase. 41 At the time johnson was
decided, Maryland Rule 209 directed only that the court should protect the interests of the class members by giving notice "in such a manner as it may direct." 42 By modeling its interpretation of Rule 209
after federal case law interpreting the federal class action rule, Maryland courts seemed to be calling out to the rule-making body for additional guidelines. Consequently, the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure ("Committee") responded in 1984 with the
enactment of the new Maryland Rule 2-231. 43
38. See johnson v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 26 Md. App. 122, 127, 337 A.2d 210,
213 (1975) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) and
stating that the Supreme Court's interpretation of Federal Rule 23 is not
binding, but is persuasive for Maryland courts and that the federal rule is
substantially more detailed than the Maryland rule).
39. 26 Md. App. 122, 337 A.2d 210 (1975).
40. 417 u.s. 156 (1974).
41. See johnson, 26 Md. App. at 128-29, 337 A.2d at 213-14.
42. See Mo. R. 209.
43. See Mo. R. 2-231. This rule states:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. Unless justice requires otherwise,
an action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of
section (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the prosecution of
separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with
respect to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class,
or (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests
of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or (2)
the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to
the class as a whole; or (3) the court finds that the questions of law
or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members and that a class action
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient ad-
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judication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions, (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the
class, (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum, (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) Certification. On motion of any party or on the court's own
initiative, the court shall determine by order as soon as practicable
after commencement of the action whether it is to be maintained
as a class action. A hearing shall be granted if requested by any
party. The order shall include the court's findings and reasons for
certifying or refusing to certify the action as a class action. The
order may be conditional and may be altered or amended before
the decision on the merits.
(d) Partial Class Actions; Subclasses. When appropriate, an action
may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or a class may be divided into subclasses and each
subclass treated as a class.
(e) Notice. In any class action, the court may require notice pursuant to subsection (f) (2). In a class action maintained under subsection (b) (3), notice shall be given to members of the class in the
manner the court directs. The notice shall advise that ( 1) the
court will exclude from the class any member who so requests by a
specified date, (2) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion, and (3) any
member who does not request exclusion and who desires to enter
an appearance through counsel may do so.
(f) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to
which this Rule applies, the court may enter appropriate orders:
(1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument, (2) requiring, for the protection of
the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the
action, that notice be given in the manner the court directs to
some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the
proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise
to come into the action, (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or intervenors, ( 4) requiring that the pleadings be
amended to eliminate allegations as to representation of absent
persons, and that the action proceed accordingly, (5) dealing with
similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an
order under Rule 2-504, and may be altered or amended as may be
desirable from time to time.
(g) Discovery. For purposes of discovery, only representative parties shall be treated as parties. On motion, the court may allow
discovery by or against any other member of the class.
(h) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court. Notice
of a proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in the manner the court directs.
(i) Judgment. The judgment in an action maintained as a class
action under subsections (b)(1) and (2), whether or not favorable
to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds
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Class Action Certification Under Maryland Rule 2-231

The Committee modeled Maryland Rule 2-231 almost entirely after
Federal Rule 23. 44 As such, Maryland courts often refer to federal
decisions for guidance when the Maryland rule fails to adequately address an issue. 45 Thus, case law interpreting Federal Rule 23 may also
be used as a guide to interpreting Maryland Rule 2-231. 46 Under both
Maryland Rule 2-231 and Federal Rule 23, class actions are maintainable only if the action meets the four threshold requirements of
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. 47
1.

Numerosity

The numerosity requirement necessitates that the class be so numerous that 'joinder of all members is impracticable."48 The rules
require no specific number oflitigants, and courts have held that satisfaction of this requirement hinges on the facts of each case. 49 Classes
with as few as twenty-five or thirty members have met the numerosity
requirement. 5° Courts generally use a common sense approach in determining whether joinder of the parties reaches the required "imto be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained
as a class action under subsection (b) (3), whether or not favorable
to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the
notice provided in subsection (e) ( 1) was directed, and who have
not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members
of the class.
/d.

44. See Md. R. 2-231 source note (listing the sections of Maryland Rule 2-231
derived from Federal Rule 23). Section g is the only section not derived
from the federal rule. /d. Compare Mo. R. 2-231 with FED. R. Cw. P. 23.
45. See, e.g., Snowden v. Bait. Gas & Elec. Co., 300 Md. 555, 479 A.2d 1329
(1984). Because Maryland Rule 2-231 does not address the appealability of
class certifications, the court of appeals looked to a federal class action case,
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), to determine whether an
order denying class certification was appealable. /d. at 562-63, 479 A.2d
1332-33. Livesay held that even if a denial of class certification sounded the
"'death-knell'" of the litigation, an order denying certification was not appealable as a matter of right, but possibly could be appealable under the
Federal Interlocutory Appeals Act. /d. Because Maryland has no similar act
regarding interlocutory appeals, the court in Snowden held that class certification orders were not appealable. /d. at 567, 479 A.2d at 1335.
46. See Pollokoff v. Md. Nat'! Bank, 288 Md. 485, 491, 418 A.2d 1201, 1205
(1980) (analyzing the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Federal Rule 23, in the context of aggregation of claims, for guidance in the
interpretation of Maryland Rule 209, the precursor to the current Maryland
Rule 2-231).
47. FED. R. Cw. P. 23(a); Mo. R. 2-231(a).
48. Mo. R. 2-231.
49. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the N.W., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980).
50. See In re Kirschner Med. Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F.R.D. 74, 78 (D. Md. 1991)
(stating that a case with twenty-five to thirty plaintiffs would be impractical
to litigate as a joinder, but not providing a strict numerical standard for
such a case) .
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practicable" standard. 51 Requiring numerosity primarily serves to
ensure that the class action prevails as necessary and more judicially
economical than joinder of the parties and claims. 52 Enforcing the
numerosity requirement also provides persons with small claims a
greater opportunity for access to the courts. 53
2.

Commonality

The Maryland rule also requires that the claims of the class members contain common questions of law or fact. 54 This requirement
ensures uniform decisions with respect to common issues, and promotes convenience and judicial economy. 55 Even a single common
issue of law or fact may adequately bind the members together as a
class for litigation under this requirement. 56 An issue should be
viewed as common "only to the extent its resolution will advance the
litigation of the entire case." 57
Achieving commonality requires only that common issues exist not that they predominate the claims of the class members. 58 Although similar to the Rule 2-231 (b) (3) requirement of predominance59 of common issues over individual issues, the commonality
requirement under Rule 2-231 (a) is less stringent and is easily met in
most cases. 60

3.

Typicality

The -requirement of typicality makes certain that the claims or defenses of the class representatives encompass the typical claims or defenses of the rest of the class. 61 In determining whether this
requirement exists in a particular case, courts use a common sense
inquiry into whether the interests of the plaintiffs represent the interests of the rest of the class. 62 There must be "similar legal and remedial theories underlying the representative claims and the claims of
51. See Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1558-59.
52. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 732, 752 A.2d 200, 223
(2000).
53. See id.
54. See Mo. R. 2-231 (a).
55. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 734, 752 A.2d at 225.
56. See id. at 736, 752 A.2d at 226.
57. !d.
58. See id. at 734, 752 A.2d at 225.
59. See infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text (explaining the predominance
requirement).
60. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 734, 737, 752 A.2d at 225-26.
61. See Mo. R. 2-231(a).
62. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 737-38, 752 A.2d at 227.
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the class." 63 Although each plaintiff's case may be factually different,
the typicality requirement may still be met. 64
Requiring typicality also ensures that the claims of the class representatives embody the best interests of those less active in the litigation.65 Essentially, the representative must be able to prove the class
members' cases by proving her own case. 66

4.

Adequacy of Representation

Maryland Rule 2-231 (a) provides in part that the "representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." 67
The adequacy of representation requirement actually addresses two
concerns: 1) that the class representatives have no conflict with the
rest of the class members, allowing each representative to vigorously
pursue the action on behalf of the other members, and 2) that the
attorney representing the class will do so with vigor and diligence. 68
In considering whether representation is "adequate," courts analyze
conflicts of interest, determine whether representatives and members
share interests, and determine whether a harmony exists between the
goals of the class members, representatives, and counsel. 69
Adequacy of representation ensures due process for the absent class
members and makes certain that the representatives, not the attorneys
for the class, control the litigation. 7° Class representatives must also
possess reasonable knowledge of the cause of action and the specifics
of the case in order to preserve due process of the absent class members. 71 Courts have refused to certify a class when a representative
lacks sufficient knowledge concerning the case. 72
63. !d.
64. See id. at 740, 752 A.2d at 228 (citing Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d
888, 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)). The court in Angeletti stated that although the typicality requirement has been met, any concerns regarding
factual differences in each plaintiff's case should be addressed under the
predominance inquiry. !d.
65. See id. at 737, 752 A.2d at 226.
66. See Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1560-61; see also ScottS. Partridge & Kerry J.
Miller, Some Practical Considerations far Defending and Settling Products Liability
and Consumer Class Actions, 74 TuL. L. REv. 2125, 2136-37 (2000). Many
courts have denied class certification of mass tort cases for this reason because such cases often involve issues of injury, causation, and affirmative
defenses. See id.
67. Mo. R. 2-231 (a).
68. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 740-41, 752 A.2d at 228; see also Partridge & Miller,
supra note 66, at 2137-38.
69. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 741-42, 752 A.2d at 229.
70. See Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1562. Due process requires that the class
representative take an active role in the litigation in order to protect the
interests of the class members and ensure that attorneys do not become the
driving force of the litigation. See id.
71. See Partridge & Miller, supra note 66, at 2139.
72. See, e.g., White v. Ensearch Corp., 78 F.R.D. 547, 548 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (refusing class action status because the plaintiff had almost a total lack of
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Classification Under Maryland Rule 2-23l(b)(3)

If a class meets each requirement of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy, it must also be certified under section (b) of
Maryland Rule 2-231. 73 Although four categories of certification exist,
the (b) (3) class is the most commonly utilized in mass tort cases. 74
Under 2-231 (b) (3), the court must find that common questions of
law or fact predominate over individual issues, and that a class action
is superior to other methods of adjudication in order to certify the
class. 75 Thus, certification under 2-231 (b) (3) generally hinges on the
issues of predominance and superiority. 76
1.

Predominance

The predominance test is practical 77 but much more demanding
than the commonality requirement of 2-231 (a). 78 The predominance
inquiry "focuses on the number and significance of common questions as opposed to individual issues. "79
Achievement of judicial economy often depends on the satisfaction
of this requirement. 80 Because individual issues of causation, damages, and defenses are usually specific to each plaintiff, most courts
hold that certifying some mass tort suits as class actions defeats the
underlying purpose of preserving judicial economy. 81 Although the
text of the rule does not explicitly prohibit the exclusion of mass tort
claims from class certification, 82 many courts look unfavorably upon

73.
74.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

knowledge about the basis of the suit); see also Butterworth v. Quick &
Reilly, Inc., 171 F.R.D. 319, 323 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (denying class certification because a representative was not knowledgeable enough about the
case to fairly represent the class members).
Mo. R. 2-231(b).
See James W. Elrod, The Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Toxic Pollution
Torts, 56 TENN. L. REv. 243, 259-67 (1988). This Comment addresses only
the (b) (3) category. Other categories under the rule are: the (b) (1) (A)
class used by parties wishing to defend against multiple adjudications, not
for the benefit of the class members; the (b) (1 )(B) class used in "limited
fund" situations; and the (b)(2) class used primarily in cases in which equitable relief is sought. See id.
Mo. R. 2-231(b)(3).
See Elrod, supra note 74, at 267.
Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1591 (stating that this prong of the test is
pragmatic).
See Mn. R. 2-231(a); Angeletti, 358 Md. at 743, 752 at 231.
See Partridge & Miller, supra note 66, at 2139.
See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 743, 752 A.2d at 229-30 (citing Valentino v. CarterWallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996)).
See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 762, 752 A.2d at 240. But see supra Part IV.C.
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (discussing
the rationale of the Advisory Committee for the 1966 revision of Rule 23 in
promulgating the rule).
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such actions. 83 As a result, often in mass tort litigation, class actions
fall short of certification because they fail this test. 84
2.

Superiority

The requirement of superiority mandates that the class action
should be the most efficient means of adjudicating the matter. 85 Maryland Rule 2-231 (b) (3) lists factors that should be considered in analyzing the superiority requirement:
(A) The interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions, (B)
the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the
class, (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum, (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action. 86
The first factor, the interest of the representative in controlling the
case, focuses on the principle that "the greater the individuals' stake
in the litigation, the greater their interest in controlling their own actions in individual litigation." 87 When drafting Federal Rule 23, the
Advisory Committee stated its reasoning for this consideration:
The interests of individuals in conducting separate lawsuits
may be so strong as to call for denial of a class action. On
the other hand ... the class may have a high degree of cohesion and prosecution of the action through representatives
would be quite unobjectionable, or the amounts at stake for
individuals may be so small that separate suits would be
impractical. 88
The second factor, the nature of the litigation already commenced,
looks to the extent and nature of litigation surrounding the claim that
has already been initiated. 89 If too much pre-existing litigation exists,
a class action may be unproductive. 90
The third factor, desirability, embodies two considerations. First,
the court must determine whether allowing the action to proceed as a
class action would reduce the possibility of inconsistent results. 91 The
second consideration requires analyzing whether the chosen forum is
83. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625; Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,
746-47 (5th Cir. 1996); Angeletti, 358 Md. at 728-29, 752 A.2d at 221-22.
85. Mo. R. 2-231 (b)(3).
86. /d.
87. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 763, 752 A.2d at 240-41.
88. FEn. R. Cw. P. 23 advisory committee's note b(3) (1966 amendments).
89. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 764, 752 A.2d at 241.
90. See id.
91. See id.

Baltimore Law Review

116

[Vol. 31

an appropriate location for the parties in interest, accessibility of witnesses and evidence, and the condition of the court's docket. 92
Finally, the court should consider the fourth factor, manageability
of the action as a class action. 93 At the crux of this factor lies the
ultimate goal of judicial economy. 94 Mass tort class action certification generally fails because of the great number of individual issues
involved, litigation of which, using the class action device, might be
unmanageable, and therefore not serve the goal of judicial
economy. 95
III.

THE INSTANT CASE

Although certification of class action lawsuits involving mass tort litigation rarely occurs, some judges have held that certain claims pass all
of the tests of Rule 2-231 (b) (3) .96 In Philip Moms Inc. v. Angeletti, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland used the extraordinary relief of mandamus to decertify a class action tobacco lawsuit, originally approved
under Rule 2-231 (b) (3) by Maryland Circuit Court Judge Edward].
Angeletti. 97

A.

Factual background

The plaintiffs in Angeletti filed their case in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, alleging that they and similarly situated Maryland residents suffered various injuries including nicotine dependency and
injuries caused by smoking cigarettes and/ or using smokeless tobacco.98 In a complaint alleging ten counts, the plaintiffs filed suit
against all tobacco manufacturers and their Maryland distributors, two
industry trade groups, and a marketing and public relations firm. 99
92. See id. at 765, 752 A.2d at 241.
93. See Mo. R. 2-231(b)(3).
94. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 765, 752 A.2d at 242; see also supra Parts N.B, V
(explaining that the court in Angeletti relies heavily on the concept of judicial economy in making its decision).
95. See id. at 765-66, 752 A.2d at 242 (citing Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co., 160 F.R.D.
667, 681 (N.D. Ohio 1995), which declared that where individual issues are
great, "this scenario is hardly the picture of judicial economy envisioned by
Rule 23").
96. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 701, 752 A.2d 200, 206
(2000).
97. Id. at 699, 752 A.2d at 205-06.
98. Id. at 699-700, 752 A.2d at 205-06.
99. Id. In the plaintiffs' fourth amended complaint, eight of the ten counts
alleged in the amended complaint included tort or contract causes of action: fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, negligence, breach of express warranties, breach of
implied warranties, strict products liability, and conspiracy. The plaintiffs
also alleged several violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.
Finally, the plaintiffs urged the court to recognize an equitable cause of
action they entitled "medical-monitoring," a fund financed by the defendants to treat and prevent future injury to the class. Id.
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The plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, which Judge
Angeletti granted. 10° Certification was divided into two classes: 1) Maryland residents with serious injury and death claims, 101 and 2) Maryland residents with nicotine dependence claims. 102 The court also
approved a proposed three-phase trial plan introduced by the plaintiffs. 103 Under Phase I of the trial plan, a class action jury trial would
be conducted to determine whether the defendants were liable to the
plaintiffs. 104 Also during Phase I, the jury would determine factual
and legal issues and decide whether those issues were common to all
class members. 105 Phase II would consist of determining issues of causation and damages for any of the claims on which the plaintiffs prevailed in Phase I. 106 Phase III would involve trial of the issues of

100. Id. at 701, 752 A.2d at 206 (stating that the class action was approved under
Maryland Rule 2-231 (b) (3) with regard to the tort and contract causes of
action, and under Maryland Rule 2-231 (b)(2) with regard to the equitable
"medical-monitoring" claim).
101. Id. The circuit court defined this class as:
All Maryland residents as of the date of class notice who have suffered, presently suffer, or who have died of diseases, medical conditions, and i~ury (while a resident of Maryland) caused by smoking
cigarettes or using smokeless tobacco products that contain nicotine, and 1) The estates, representatives, and administrators of
these persons; and 2) The spouses, children, relatives and significant others of these persons as their heirs or survivors.
!d.
102. Id. at 701-02, 752 A.2d at 206-07. The circuit court defined this class as:
All nicotine dependent persons in Maryland who have purchased
and used cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products manufactured
by the Defendant Tobacco Companies .... "[N]icotine dependent"
shall be defined as: 1) All cigarette smokers or smokeless tobacco
users who have been diagnosed by a medical practitioner as nicotine dependent, and/ or; 2) All cigarette smokers who have regularly smoked more than 15 cigarettes per day for at least three years
and who have made at least one unsuccessful effort to quit smoking, and/or; 3) All regular daily users of smokeless tobacco products for at least three years and who have made at least one
unsuccessful effort to quit using smokeless tobacco.
!d.
103. See id. at 702, 752 A.2d at 207.
104. See id. at 702-03, 752 A.2d at 207.
105. I d. Examples of the factual and legal issues to be determined by the jury
include: whether nicotine in the defendants' cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products is addictive; whether the defendants' manipulated the
amounts of nicotine contained in the tobacco products; whether the defendants knew and intentionally concealed information that tobacco causes
disease; whether cigarettes are defectively designed; whether affirmative defenses such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk are applicable under the laws of Maryland; and whether Maryland allows punitive
damages in such cases. Id.
106. Id. at 703, 752 A.2d at 207.
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causation, damages, and smoking history for each individual plaintiff
who had proved he was an established class member. 107
In response to the class certification order, defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Class Notice and to Stay Issuance of Class
Notice. 108 The circuit court denied this motion upon hearing. 109 The
defendants then filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/ or Writ of
Prohibition with the Court of Appeals, requesting that the court of
appeals order the circuit court to decertify the class. 110 On the same
day, defendants also filed a motion with the circuit court requesting a
stay of class notice pending the decision of the court of appeals regarding the Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 111 The circuit court denied this motion. 112 The defendants then filed a Motion for a Stay of
Class Notice Pending Petition for Writ of Mandamus with the Court of
Appeals.U 3 The court granted this motion, pending the decision on
the Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 114
In requesting that the court of appeals grant the writ of mandamus,
the defendants argued that because there could be no opportunity to
appeal the class certification until Phase III of the trial, both the parties and the judicial system would suffer irreparable harm if, in fact,
the certification of the class were improper. 115 The defendants also
asserted that the circuit court committed an abuse of discretion in
certifying the class under Maryland Rule 2-231 because the class members did not meet the prerequisites of the rule, including predominance, superiority, and manageability. 116 The defendants also
claimed that the circuit court did not consider closely enough many
of the important individual issues relevant to the certification, including contributory negligence, assumption of risk, conflict of laws,
fraud, statutes of limitations, causation, and reliance.U 7
In their response, the plaintiffs contended that the court of appeals
lacked authority to issue a writ of mandamus. 118 They claimed that
the court of special appeals had "primary jurisdiction" to decide on
107. !d. At this stage, individual plaintiffs have the choice of proceeding with a
full jury trial on the issues determined in Phase III, accepting the damages
awarded during Phase III, having a summary jury trial on the issues determined in Phase III or initiating proceedings before a special master or magistrate on all of the issues in Phase III.
108. !d.
109. !d. at 703, 752 A.2d at 207-08.
110. See id. For a discussion of the difference between a writ of mandamus and
writ of prohibition, see Angeletti, 358 Md. at 707 n.5, 752 A.2d at 209 n.5.
Ill. !d. at 703, 752 A.2d at 207-08.
112. !d.
113. !d. at 703-04, 752 A.2d at 208.
114. !d. at 704, 752 A.2d at 208. One week later, both the plaintiffs and the
Attorney General filed oppositions to this motion. !d.
115. !d.
116. !d.
117. !d.
118. !d. at 705, 752 A.2d at 208.
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the petition for writ of mandamus at this stage of the case. 119 Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that issuance of a writ of mandamus or
prohibition should have been subject to the standard of whether there
was a judicial "'usurpation of power,'" not whether the ruling was
merely erroneous or based on an '"abuse of discretion."' 12° Finally,
plaintiffs stated that the right to appeal on final judgment afforded
the defendants the appropriate legal remedy to address any alleged
mistakes of the circuit court. 121

B.

Writ of Mandamus

The court of appeals issued the writ of mandamus, decertifying the
class action. 122 In its decision, the court of appeals held that the rules
governing the appellate process were inapplicable because at common law, the "writ of mandamus is an original action and not an appeal."123 Therefore, the court held that appellate rules did not apply
and did not preclude the court of appeals' issuance of a writ of mandamus.124 Additionally, the court noted that because the writ of mandamus is not an appeal, the court of special appeals did not possess
primary jurisdiction over the action. 125 As a result, the court held that
"under the circumstances of this case" and "in aid of our appellate
jurisdiction," the power to issue a writ of mandamus rested with the
court of appeals. 126 However, the court did note the preference for
the final judgment rule 127 and the need for the defendants to demon119. ld. at 705, 752 A.2d at 208-09. In support of their argument, plaintiffs cited
In rePetition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 539 A.2d 664 (1988), which
held that Title 8 superseded the ability of the court of appeals to issue mandamus or prohibition in aid of appellate jurisdiction. !d. They also claimed
that even if appellate review of the certification were appropriate at this
point in the case, under the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction," the court of
appeals may only assert jurisdiction if the motion is filed in the intermediate appellate court, the court of special appeals. See id.
120. Id. at 706, 752 A.2d at 209. In support of this claim, the plaintiffs stated
that the judgment and legal reasoning of the lower court were sound and
in accordance with the Maryland class action rule. Id.
121. ld. (explaining that because the case was at the interlocutory stage, the issuance of a writ of mandamus or prohibition would be "unnecessary and
improper").
122. Id.
123. Id. at 707, 752 A.2d at 210 (citing Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 145,
680 A.2d 1040, 1047 (1996)).
124. Id. at 709, 752 A.2d at 210-11 (explaining that Title 8 does not prohibit the
court from issuing a writ of mandamus).
125. ld. at 709, 752 A.2d at 211.
126. ld. at 710, 752 A.2d at 211. The court explained that "in aid of appellate
jurisdiction" means that the court should have the authority to review a
potentially unreviewable question by issuing a writ of mandamus or prohibition. Justification for this authority lies in the potential irreparable harm to
the moving party and the need to maintain the integrity of the legal system.
Id. at 711, 752 A.2d at 212.
127. See infra note 265 and accompanying text (explaining the final judgment
rule).
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strate a "paramount public policy interest" to overcome the fact that
an alternative remedy to mandamus already existed. 128 The court
held that a paramount public policy interest did exist due to the immeasurable amount of time and expense to be incurred by both the
parties and the Maryland judicial system. 129 Therefore, the court of
appeals held that it had the right to issue a writ of mandamus should
it subsequently find that the class should be decertified upon an examination of the merits. 130
C.

Merits of Class Certification Under Maryland Rule 2-231

With regard to the initial four requirements of class certification, 131
the court first analyzed the numerosity requirement. 132 The court of
appeals held, and both parties agreed, that because this litigation
could potentially impact hundreds of thousands of Maryland residents, the numerosity requirement was easily satisfied. 133
Regarding commonality, 134 the court stated that "an issue of law or
fact should be deemed 'common' only to the extent its resolution
[would] advance the litigation of the entire case." 135 Taking this standard into consideration, the court allowed the finding of commonality
by the circuit court to stand, but explained that the more stringent
requirement of predominance of common issues over issues of individuals would be addressed further in its analysis. 136
Regarding the requirement of typicality, 137 the court expressed
some concern with the degree of differences between the plaintiffs'
claims, and stated that this problem would also be addressed during
the predominance inquiry. 138 As a result, the court held that the cir128. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 712-13, 752 A.2d at 213; see also Brack v. Wells, 184 Md.
86, 90-91, 40 A.2d 319, 321 (1944) (stating that a writ of mandamus should
not be granted if the petitioner has another adequate legal remedy). In
Angeletti, the alternate legal remedy was to appeal after a final judgment
had been ordered, in lieu of this interlocutory mandamus. Angeletti, 358
Md. at 713, 752 A.2d at 213.
129. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 722, 752 A.2d at 218.
130. /d.
131. See supra Part II.B.1-4 (noting that numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation are the four requirements).
132. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of
numerosity).
133. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 733, 752 A.2d at 224.
134. See supra notes 54-60 (discussing the concept of commonality).
135. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 736, 752 A.2d at 226 (citing Insolia v. Philip Morris
Inc., 186 F.R.D. 535, 542 (W.D. Wis. 1998)).
136. /d. at 736-37, 752 A.2d at 226.
137. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of
typicality).
138. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 740, 752 A.2d at 228.
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cuit court did not commit an abuse of discretion in finding that the
typicality requirement had been satisfied. 139
The defendants did not dispute the adequacy of the class representatives, and the court did not discuss this issue. 140 However, the court
did address the defendants' argument that counsel for the plaintiffs
had a concurrent conflict of interest due to another case in which
plaintiffs' counsel represented the State of Maryland against the same
defendants. 141 The court found that because the State of Maryland
had entered into a finalized settlement agreement with the defendants, no conflict of interest existed. 142 Therefore, the requirement of
adequate representation had been satisfied. 143
Thus, according to the court, the plaintiffs easily met all four requirements of Maryland Rule 2-231 (a) in the first step of class certification.144 The court then turned its attention to the requirement of
predominance under Rule 2-231(b). 145
1.

Predominance

On examination of the plaintiffs' individual issues, the court first
considered conflict of laws issues. 146 The plaintiffs argued that only
Maryland law applied to all class members, as the class contained only
members who suffered injury in Maryland. 147 The defendants countered with the argument that the class necessitated an individual
choice of law analysis for each member because a determination needed
to be made as to the exact location of the individual when the addiction began. 148 The court stated that Maryland adheres to the lex loci
delicti rule of tort law, which holds that the laws of the state where the
injury occurred should apply. 149 The First Restatement of Conflict of
139. !d. The court explained that at this stage of the litigation, the plaintiffs had
met their burden by alleging that" 'the same unlawful conduct was directed
at or affected both the named plaintiff[s] and the class[es] sought to be
represented.'" Id. (quoting 1 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CoNTE, NEWBERG
ON CLASS AcrtONS § 3.13, at 3-77 (3d. ed. 1992)).
140. !d. at 742, 752 A.2d at 229.
141. !d. (stating that some of the class members' interests and the State of Maryland's interest conflict with regard to Medicaid expense reimbursement).
142. !d. (citing Agreed Dismissal Order, State v. Philip Morris Inc., No.
96122201/CL211487 (Bait. City Cir. Ct., Dec. 1, 1998)).
143. !d. at 743, 752 A.2d at 229.
144. !d.
145. !d.; see also supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
146. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 744, 752 A.2d at 230.
147. !d.
148. !d. (citing the plaintiffs' brief at the circuit court level).
149. !d. Lex loci delicti is a traditional conflict of laws principle, and one that only
a few states still utilize. It requires that "when an accident occurs in another state substantive rights of the parties, even though they are domiciled
in Maryland, are to be determined by the law of the state in which the
alleged tort took place." !d. at 745, 752 A.2d at 230 (quoting White v. King,
244 Md. 348, 352, 233 A.2d 763, 765 (1966)).
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Laws defines the "place of injury" as "'where the last event necessary
to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.' " 150 The court
held that without individual assessments, based on the principles of
Maryland tort law, it would be impossible to apply only Maryland law
to each individual. 151 The court explained further that because a person exposed to tobacco in one state may experience effects of disease
in another state and may be diagnosed in yet another state, the class
of injured plaintiffs may not necessarily be subject to the substantive
laws of Maryland, and as a result, Maryland may not qualify as the
place where the last wrong occurred. 152 In addition, the class of plaintiffs alleging nicotine addiction may not be subject solely to the laws of
Maryland because such plaintiffs may have become addicted in another state and simply moved to Maryland, where they remained addicted. 153 In sum, the court held that because the class included only
"Maryland residents," it did not necessarily mean that those residents
were harmed in Maryland. 154 Therefore, the laws of the state where
the wrong occurred may not be the state of Maryland. 155
2.

Additional Individual Issues

The legal nature of the claims of fraud and deceit and negligent
misrepresentation sealed the fate of the predominance inquiry against
the plaintiffs. 156 These claims placed the burden on the plaintiffs of
proving that each individual plaintiff relied on material misrepresentations of the defendants. 157 Therefore, the court concluded that because proof of reliance represented a unique issue for each plaintiff,
individual issues predominated over common issues. 158 With regard
to the claims of negligent misrepresentation, the court recognized
150. /d. at 746, 752 A.2d at 231. Because Maryland is one of only a few states
that continues to adhere to the lex loci delicti principle, reference to the First
Restatement of Conflict of Laws is proper, although it is only of historical
guidance in other states. /d.
151. See id. at 747, 752 A.2d at 232 (citing Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83
F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996)).
152. /d. at 748, 752 A.2d at 232; see also Geiger v. Am. Tobacco Co., 696 N.Y.S.2d
345, 349 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (stating that a tobacco case is not a mass tort
arising from a single accident or event).
153. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 749, 752 A.2d at 233 (stating that "place of injury" is
not necessarily equivalent to "place of residency").
154. /d.
155. /d.
156. /d. at 750, 752 A.2d at 234. The plaintiffs' claims under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act were similar in nature to these claims, and therefore
were also unsuitable for class action treatment. /d.
157. /d. at 750-51, 752 A.2d at 234 (explaining that each plaintiff must show
reliance on material misrepresentations regarding nicotine's addictive
characteristics, the detrimental health effects of tobacco, the defendants'
knowledge of and research regarding the adverse effects of tobacco, and
the defendants' manipulation of nicotine levels in their tobacco products).
158. /d. at 751, 752 A.2d at 234 (citing the Advisory Committee's Note for Federal Rule 23, which states that although fraud cases may have a common
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that determining reliance under this claim would also vary from plaintiff to plaintiff. 159
More individual issues weighed against the prerequisite of predominance of common issues. 160 Those issues included: 1) whether an individual is either "'dependent'" on or "'addicted'" to nicotine; 2)
whether the emotional distress alleged in the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is "'severe;"' 3) whether affirmative defenses such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk apply;
and 4) whether comparative negligence issues arise, depending on in
which state the wrong occurred. 161 The court expressed "serious
doubts" that these and other individual issues related to causation
would not need to be addressed individually at some point during the
litigation. 162
3.

Superiority

When determining whether the prereqmstte of superiority had
been met, 163 the court held that the members of each class had a
great interest in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions. 164 The court pointed out that the plaintiffs claimed
in excess of $500,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages for each class member. 165 Regarding the extent of litigation already commenced, the court found that because so few
individual tobacco cases were currently pending in the courts of Maryland, there existed little risk of inconsistent judgments or of a flood of
individual claims if certification were to be denied. 166
core, they are unsuitable for class action treatment if there is a material
difference in the kinds or degrees of reliance of each plaintiff).
159. /d. at 753-54, 752 A.2d at 235 (drawing this conclusion after reading depositions from several class members).
160. See id. at 755, 752 A.2d at 236.
161. /d.
162. /d. at 755-56, 752 A.2d at 237 (citing Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 186 F.R.D.
535, 546 (W.D. Wis. 1998) for the proposition that "[c]ausation remains
one of the more formidable issues not subject to general proof'); accord
Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1997), a.ffd, 161 F.3d
127, 135 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1114 (1999) (stating that
"[t]he resolution of this 'general causation question' would accomplish
nothing for any of the individual plaintiffs"); Smith v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90, 96 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (stating that a decision
finding cigarettes "generally capable of causing disease" would have a minimal effect in advancing the litigation because, ultimately, liability would
turn on "whether cigarettes caused a particular plaintiff's disease").
163. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text (discussing the superiority
requirement).
164. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 763, 752 A.2d at 241 (noting that individuals may have
significant stakes in individual tobacco litigation).
165. /d.
166. /d. at 764, 752 A.2d at 241.
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When considering the desirability of utilizing one forum for resolution of the claims, the court held that because this lawsuit involved
many Maryland residents, the present forum of the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City was as an appropriate forum as any other in Maryland.167 Also, under the superiority inquiry, because individual issues
would require many separate and potentially extensive trials, the court
held that certification of this class would not further judicial
economy. 168
Thus, because the elements of superiority and predominance had
not been met according to the court of appeals, the court held that
decertification was appropriate. As such, the court issued a writ of
mandamus ordering Judge Angeletti to decertify the class.

IV.

ANALYSIS OF ANGELETTI

A.

Tobacco Litigation Class Action Suits in Other jurisdictions

Nationally, the tobacco industry generally opposes class action certification.169 Mass tort class actions in several states have been struck
down, and as of the writing of this Comment, only a few have been
certified and viable to any extent in the United StatesP0 While difficulties in proceeding with a class action of this type present a virtual
bar to representative litigation of tobacco claims, some modifications
may exist that would afford both the parties and the courts a more
efficient and fair litigation process. 171
Much skepticism exists regarding the certification of tobacco class
actions. 172 While some courts have held that in most tobacco class
action suits individual issues predominate over common issues of law
or fact, or that class actions do not represent the superior device for
litigating such claims, 173 other courts have found creative ways to utilize the class action device in mass tort cases. 174
167. Id. at 765, 752 A.2d at 242.
168. Id. (citing Emig v. Am. Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379, 393 (D. Kan. 1998),
which held that a similar trial plan would not further judicial economy because it would require many individual trials).
169. Tobacco, Lung Cancer Victims Seek Class Certification in judge Weinstein's Court,
MEALEY's LITIGATION REPORTS, July 6, 2000 (stating that the industry opposes certification on several grounds).
170. See, e.g., RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996); Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
171. See infra Part IV.
172. See In reAgent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 1987);
see generally 3 NEWBURG ON CLASs AcTIONS§ 17.02 (3d ed. 1992).
173. See Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
174. Other courts have also approved use of the class action device to decide
issues that are common to all plaintiffs. In In reAgent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1987), the court approved a mass
tort class action solely to resolve a military contractor defense, which was
common to all plaintiffs. However, the court also qualified the case in stat-
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In Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 175 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit certified a class action in an environmental toxic tort case. 176 While individual issues of causation and damages existed, the court stated that individualization of issues did not
justify denying class action certification in mass tort claims. 177 The
court in Sterling allowed the class action to proceed with five class representatives to determine the issue of general causation - whether the
plaintiffs' exposure to the contamination could have caused the alleged
irBuries. 178 Although the court noted that its decision to pursue the
case as a class action would necessitate further individualized litigation
to determine proof of individual damages, 179 it rejected the idea that
a need existed for "a more efficient method of disposing of a large
number of lawsuits" and held that a class action was superior for determining some issues. 180
The court in Sterling recognized that utilizing the class action device
to resolve issues common to all plaintiffs would likely improve the efficiency of handling mass tort cases. 181 In fact, certification on a general causation issue may produce three possible outcomes: 1) the
exposure to a product will always cause harm; 2) the exposure will
never cause harm; or 3) exposure may or may not cause harm, depending on various factors. 182 If the judge or jury determines that the
product exposure will never cause harm, further adjudication is unnecessary.183 If causation is established, individual issues must still be
heard 184 at the risk of trying possibly thousands of cases over a period

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

184.

ing that, had the case been based on exposure to toxins in civilian affairs,
class certification would have been an error. /d. The Third Circuit also
certified a class action to determine a single issue in In re School Asbestos
Litigation, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986). In that case, the court allowed certification for the purpose of determining property damages because, according to the court, although asbestos affected several different buildings, it
affected each building in the same manner. /d. However, the court added
that because the effect of asbestos on people is unlike the effect of asbestos
on buildings, personal injury determinations for each individual would be
required and would therefore not be appropriate. /d. at 1009-11.
885 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
/d. at 1197. The plaintiffs alleged personal injuries as a result of drinking
water that had been contaminated by chemicals leaking from the defendant's landfill. /d. at 1192.
!d. at 1197.
!d. at 1197-200.
/d. at 1200.
/d. at 1196-97.
/d. at 1197.
See Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at 164-65.
See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 781-83, 785 (3d Cir.
1994) (affirming summary judgment against the plaintiffs because the
plaintiffs failed to prove that exposure to the defendant's toxins caused
their injuries).
Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1200.
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of years. 185 However, these issues would have to be tried individually
regardless of the method of litigation. 186
Clearly, Judge Angeletti contemplated the need for individuallitigation.187 By approving Phase III of the trial plan proposal, he planned
to allow individual class members to proceed in one of four ways to
determine issues such as causation and damages, after having decided
factual and legal issues common to all class members. 188 While the
Phase III trials in Angeletti would represent the bulk of the individual
litigation that the court of appeals claims would be judicially inefficient, certification to determine common issues in Phases I and II
might actually sustain judicial economy. 189
B.

Conflict of Laws

Determining which state's laws apply to each plaintiff factors into
both the predominance and superiority requirements, and often
presents additional individual issues to be decided. 190 Not surprisingly, courts of other jurisdictions have refused to certify class actions
based on the necessity of overwhelming choice of law inquiries for
each class member. 191
The court in Angeletti relied on the traditional tort principle of lex
loci delicti in refusing certification and decided that under this principle, a tort action must be "'governed by the substantive law of the
state where the wrong occurred.' "192 Using lex loci delicti, even when
185. See Owens-Illinois v. Levin, 792 F.Supp. 429, 431 (D. Md. 1992) (hypothesizing that trying 9000 asbestos cases would take over 100 years); Cimino v.
Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 652 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (stating that it
could take six and a half years to try 2298 cases); R.Joseph Barton, Utilizing
Statistics and Bellwether Trials in Mass Torts: What do the Constitution and Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Permit?, 8 WM. & MARv BILL RTs. J. 199, 209 n.83
(comparing Owens-Illinois with Cimino and stating that "[a]pparently, the
courts in Texas are more efficient than those in Maryland," but adding that
regardless of the accuracy of these estimates, trying a large number of cases
would obviously strain the court system).
186. See Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1200; Angeletti, 358 Md. at 760, 752 A.2d at 238.
187. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
188. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 703, 752 A.2d at 207; see also supra notes 105-09 and
accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text (stating that some courts have
narrowed the class in order to make use of the class action device more
manageable).
190. See Susan E. Kearns, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1336, 1369 (1999).
191. The Fifth Circuit denied certification of a nationwide class action based on
the complexity of the choice of law inquiry, which would have required an
analysis of the tort laws of each state. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d
734, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that determining choice of law for each
individual would not be impossible, but it would make individual litigation
more attractive than proceeding with the litigation as a class action).
192. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 746, 752 A.2d at 230 (quoting Hauch v. Connor, 295
Md. 120, 123, 453 A.2d 1207, 1209 (1983)).
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an injury occurs in another state and the injured party is domiciled in
Maryland, courts apply the substantive laws of the state in which the
alleged tort occurred. 193 Lex loci delicti no longer maintains universal
acceptance, and less than one half of the states continue to adhere to
it. 194 Maryland considered overruling the doctrine of lex loci delicti in
lVhite v. King, 195 but refused to do so. 196 Citing the court of special
appeals, the Angeletti court noted that "Maryland is among the few
states that continue to adhere to the traditional conflict of laws principle of lex loci delicti, ... while of merely historical interest elsewhere,
[lex loci delictt] continues to provide guidance for the determination of
... questions in Maryland." 197 In applying this tort principle, Judge
Angeletti did not rule out the need for individualized inquiries. However, the Court of Appeals of Maryland believed that he "simply misapplied the [rules of choice of] law," in deciding that only Maryland law
would apply to each class member. 198
Like Maryland, Kansas also adheres to the tort principles of lex loci
delicti. 199 The United States District Court for the District of Kansas
also refused to certify a class action brought by Kansas smokers in Emig
v. American Tobacco Co. 200 To avoid related choice of law problems,
the plaintiffs sought to limit members of the class to persons whose
claims were "properly disposed of under Kansas law." 201 The court
reasoned that in their attempt to narrow the class for choice of law
purposes, the plaintiffs overlooked the difficulty in determining
whether each class member's injury actually occurred in Kansas. 202 If,
for example, addiction were the alleged injury, each member would
have to prove they became addicted to tobacco in Kansas through individual hearings with opportunities for the defendant to crossexamine.203
Even the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
recognized that Maryland lags behind in utilizing its current tort principle, asserting that "against what may be the general trend of latter
times toward 'significant relationship' analysis, [Maryland] appears
193. /d. at 745,752 A.2d at 230 (citing White v. King, 244 Md. 348,352, 223 A.2d
763, 765 (1966)).
194. See Guitierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 316, 316 n.2 (Tex. 1979) (citing
case law from each state and listing the jurisdictions that have rejected lex
loci delictz) .

195. 244 Md. 348, 354-57, 223 A.2d 763, 765-67 (1966).
196. /d. at 355, 223 A.2d at 767; see also Guitierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 316 n.2.
197. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 745 n.25, 752 A.2d at 231 n.25 (citing Black v. Leatherwood, 92 Md. App. 27, 41, 606 A.2d 295, 301, cert. denied, 327 Md. 626, 612
A.2d 257 (1992)).
198. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 747, 752 A.2d at 232.
199. See Emig v. Am. Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379, 394 (D. Kan. 1988).
200. /d. at 395.
201. /d. at 393-94.
202. /d. at 394.
203. /d.

128

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 31

rather steadfastly to have adhered to lex loci [delicti] as the ordering
principle in tort cases." 204 One remedy for alleviating choice of law
problems could involve Maryland adopting the "significant relationship" analysis 205 over the antiquated doctrine of lex loci delicti. 206 The
significant relationship analysis is derived from section 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and states, in part, that "[t]he
rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which ... has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties." 207 This approach
may offer a more rational and flexible guideline for courts when deciding conflicts issues. 208
Florida adheres to the significant relationship analysis when analyzing choice of law in tort actions. 209 Coincidentally, at least one class
action tobacco lawsuit has, to date, been successfully certified by the
Florida courts, with certain modifications. 210
1.

RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle

In a 1996 Florida class action case, plaintiffs brought a products liability action against RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Company and other tobacco manufacturers. 211 Those plaintiffs sought damages for alleged
addictions and various other claims, similar to those of the plaintiffs in
Angeletti. 212 The trial court in Engle certified the class of plaintiffs including "' [a]ll United States citizens ... who have suffered ... from
diseases and medical conditions caused by their addiction to cigarettes ... .' "213 The defendants appealed the order of certification. 214
On interlocutory appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal held
that the plaintiffs had not successfully satisfied the superiority require204. Farwell v. Un, 902 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1990).
205. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws§ 145 (1971).
206. See Guitierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 318 (noting other appropriate conflicts theories
may be available including the "governmental interests" test, the "functional approach," the "principles of preference," the "better law" theory,
and "choice-influencing considerations").
207. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws§ 145 (emphasis added).
208. See Guitierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 318 (discarding the lex loci delicti principle for
the more modern significant relationship test).
209. See Tune v. Philip Morris Inc., 766 So. 2d 350,353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
210. See RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
211. Id. at 40.
212. Compare id. (stating plaintiffs' causes of action as strict liability in tort, fraud
and misrepresentation, breach of implied warranty of merchantability and
fitness, negligence, breach of express warranty, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and equitable relief), with Angeletti, 358 Md. at 700, 752
A.2d at 206 (stating the plaintiffs' causes of action as strict products liability,
fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, breach of expressed and implied warranties, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence
and conspiracy).
213. Engle, 672 So. 2d at 40.
214. !d.
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ment of the Florida class action rule. 215 Similar to Maryland Rule 2231, the Florida class action rule is modeled after Federal Rule 23. 216
However, in affirming the trial court's order of certification, the Engle
court held that by reducing the class to "manageable proportions"
and restricting members to "Florida citizens and residents," the class
action could proceed. 217 By narrowing the class to include only Florida residents, the class action presumably met all requirements under
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(b) (3). Although the court in
Engle did not discuss potential issues of determining choice of law for
each class member, 218 and it appears from the case that the defendants did not argue choice oflaw, one may assume that, under Florida's
significant relationship test, 219 Florida law applied to all class
members.

2.

Broin v. Philip Morris Co.

While the court in Engle did not discuss conflict of law issues, at least
one other Florida class action tobacco case has discussed those issues
in certifying a class action. 220 In Broin v. Philip Morris Co., flight attendants filed suit against tobacco manufacturers alleging i~uries
caused by inhalation of second-hand smoke in airplane cabins. 221 The
defendants argued that under the commonality inquiry, different
choice of law provisions would apply among the class members,
thereby making the plaintiffs' claims too diverse to litigate as a class
action, in addition to defeating the commonality requirement. 222
However, the Broin court disagreed and stated the following:
Conflict of laws problems need not defeat the commonality
requirement and deprive plaintiffs of class status. Close scrutiny of these issues may reveal fewer discrepancies among
substantive laws of various states than defendants would have
us believe. Subclasses can be utilized to deal with this situation should the need arise. 223
215. ld. at 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the plaintiffs did not make
the requisite showing of superiority under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.220(b)(3)).
216. See Broin v. Philip Morris Co., 641 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(stating that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220 is patterned after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23).
217. Engle, 672 So. 2d at 42.
218. See generally RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996).
219. See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text (discussing the significant relationship test).
220. See Broin v. Philip Morris Co., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
221. Id. at 889.
222. ld. at 891.
223. ld. at 891 n.2 (citation omitted).
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As in Engle, the court in Broin found that choice of law issues did not
bar the plaintiffs from utilizing the class action device. 224 In fact, both
courts condoned the use of subclasses or narrowing the class in order
to make the class action more manageable. 225

3.

Maryland and the Significant Relationship Test

If Maryland adopted the approach used in both Engle and Broin, as
well as the significant relationship test, and applied it in a similar manner, many of the issues raised in the predominance inquiry would be
resolved. For example, the court in Angeletti expressed concern that a
plaintiff could be exposed to tobacco in one state, show manifestations of disease in another state, and receive a diagnosis of disease in
yet another state. 226 Applying lex loci delicti, a Maryland court would
then have to determine exactly where the wrong occurred in order to
apply the law of that state to the particular plaintiff. 227 As the court in
Angeletti stated, this poses a difficult task, especially when dealing with
issues of addiction. 228 However, by utilizing the significant relationship test, the court would analyze the applicable law for the same
plaintiff by determining which state had the most significant relationship to the plaintiff or the injury. 229 Under the significant
relationship analysis, one Florida court held that even though a
plaintiff had been a smoker in another state for most of his life,
because he had been domiciled in Florida for the past ten years,
Florida law applied, regardless of the plaintiff's primary place of
exposure to the defendant's tobacco product. 230 By narrowing
the class of plaintiffs to Maryland residents, or an even narrower subclass, and following the significant relationship guidelines
from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, 231 Maryland courts
!d. at 888; see also supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
Brain, 641 So.2d at 888; see also supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
Angeletti, 348 Md. at 748, 752 A.2d at 232.
!d. at 744-46, 752 A.2d at 230-31.
See supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties in
determining choice of law for plaintiffs alleging addiction as injury).
229. See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text (discussing the significant
relationship test).
230. Tune v. Philip Morris Inc., 766 So. 2d 350, 354-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(explaining that the burden fell on the defendant to prove that the law of
the plaintiff's former state of New Jersey had a more significant relationship
to the action).
231. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws§ 145(2) (1971) states:
Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles ... to
determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place
where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality,
place of incorporation and place of business ofthe parties, and (d)
the place where the relationship, if any between the parties is centered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
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could easily determine that only Maryland law applies to each plaintiff.232

C. judicial Economy
While solving choice of law issues may reduce the number of individual issues to be addressed in a class action, as the court in Angeletti
points out, individual hearings for each plaintiff would still be necessary to determine reliance issues and damages. 233 According to the
Angeletti court, even "' [r] esolution of the common issues in this case
[would] not promote judicial economy; in fact, in light of the individual issues a class action in this case will create judicial diseconomy.' "234
In analyzing whether the plaintiffs met the superiority requirement,
the Angeletti court held that the case should be decertified due to its
unmanageability. 235 The court relied on several cases from other jurisdictions that generally held that where individual issues necessitate
many individual trials, judicial economy would not be served by certification of a class action. 236 Other courts, however, have refused to allow 'judicial diseconomy" to bar plaintiffs from proceeding with their
claims as a class action. For example, the court in Engle agreed that it
must consider the effect on the judicial system when certifying a class
action; however, the court held that while class certification would still
necessitate individual trials, a class limited solely to Florida residents
would not unduly burden the courts and taxpayers of Florida. 237 In
addition, the court in Broin stated that certifying the class would aid
judicial economy because a class action would avoid inconsistent or
/d.

232. See Guitierrez, 583 S.W.2d at 319 (stating that most courts would rule as a
matter of law that under the significant relationship analysis, the law of the
state where the parties were domiciled would apply if the injury to the
plaintiff occurred in another state).
233. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 750-57, 752 A.2d 200, 23437 (2000) (discussing additional individual issues, including reliance as an
element of fraud, and negligent misrepresentation and addiction as
injury).
234. /d. at 760, 752 A.2d at 239 (quoting Smith v. Brown & Williamson, 174
F.R.D. 90, 94 (W.D. Mo. 1997)).
235. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 768-69, 752 A.2d at 244.
236. /d. at 242, 752 A.2d at 765-66. To support its position disfavoring class actions with a high number of individual issues, the Angeletti court cited Emig
v. Am. Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379, 393 (D. Kan. 1998), which held that a
similar trial plan would not further judicial economy because it would
"greatly complicate the management of the class action." The court also
mentioned Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co., 160 F.R.D. 667, 681 (N.D. Ohio 1995),
which stated that individual hearings are "hardly the picture of judicial
economy envisioned by Rule 23." /d.
237. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39, 41-42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
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multiple similar decisions of the issues that were common to the class
members. 238
While judicial diseconomy may ultimately prevent class action litigation of tobacco-related injuries, the court in Angeletti failed to suggest
any other approach, whether viable or otherwise, for litigation of the
plaintiffs' claims and only hinted at feasible alternatives after decertification. In dicta, the court briefly acknowledged the financial struggle
many plaintiffs would face if they were to bring their claims individually against a tobacco manufacturer. 239 The court then cited two cases
in which plaintiffs asserted that individual suits were infeasible. 240
Those courts held that the disparity of resources between the individuals and the defendant tobacco companies was "'overstated,"' 241 and
that there existed no "'shortage of attorneys willing to undertake tobacco litigation.' "242 Finally, the court added that a possibility existed
that potential claimants were not filing individual suits because they
felt they had no compensable injury, or they did not want to stop
smoking. 243
As a result of decertification, many of the class members in Angeletti
may never file an individual action, likely because of their lack of financial resources. While prohibiting a class action may preserve the
court's goal of judicial economy, it might not ultimately enhance the
goals ofjustice. 244 Consistent with the original goals of representative
litigation, 245 the class action device should be made available to plaintiffs who want to offset the overwhelming cost of litigation by sharing
expenses with other class members. 246 By sharing expenses the plaintiffs may financially be able to sustain the litigation of their claims,
thereby granting them true access to the courts.
Even the United States Supreme Court has recognized the importance of a plaintiff's ability to litigate using the class action device as a
means of reducing costs: 247 "It is a fundamental principle of American
law that every person is entitled to his or her day in court," 248 regard238. Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888, 891 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
239. Angeletti, 358 Md. at 763, 752 A.2d at 241 (stating that the court finds this
situation for the plaintiffs "relevant and compelling").
240. /d.
241. /d. (quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747 n.25 (5th Cir.
1996) ).
242. /d. at 764, 752 A.2d at 241 (quoting Reed v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 96-5070,
1997 WL 538921, at *12 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1997)).
243. /d. (citing Reed v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 96-5070, 1997 WL 538921, at *12
(D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1997)).
244. See Pruitt v. Allied Chern. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100, 115 (E.D. Va. 1980).
245. See supra Part II.
246. See Mark C. Weber, Thanks jiJT Not Suing: The Prospects jiJT State Court Class
Action Litigation Over Tobacco Injuries, 33 GA. L. REv. 979, 1009 (1999).
247. See id. (citing Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 n.9
(1980))
248. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (noting that class
actions may provide a more effective avenue when the pursuit of litigation
0
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less of his or her ability to secure an experienced attorney and adequate funding to match that of the defendant tobacco companies.
Tobacco litigation is "hideously expensive" 249 for both plaintiffs and
defendants, and often the cases are won by the party who has the most
money to spend. 250
As evidenced by the differing rationales of Angeletti and both the
Engle and Broin decisions, courts must inevitably balance judicial economy with overall fairness to the parties. 251 However, while preserving
the basic elements required under the rules promoting judicial economy, courts must allow every plaintiff his day in court. 252
D.

Writ of Mandamus

Even if plaintiffs could successfully craft an argument convincing a
Maryland court to certify their suit as a class action, after Angeletti, the
court of appeals would almost certainly reject certification long before
the lower court issued a final judgment on the merits. 253
1.

Appealability of Class Certification Orders

In 1984, the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided Snowden v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. 254 and held that class certification was not appealable because it was not dispositive of a party's entire claim. 255 A
search for guidance in federal court decisions on the issue of appealability was fruitless, as Congress had enacted the Federal Interlocutory
Appeals Act, authorizing interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions in federal court. 256 The lack of a similar provision in Maryland
forced the court in Snowden to hold as it did. 257
Generally, appeals are limited to final decisions on the merits, 258
and, as of the writing of this Comment, Maryland has not enacted a
statute or rule that allows for interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions. 259 Before Angeletti, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
by each individual would be uneconomical); see also Tice v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 1998).
249. See Weber, supra note 246, at 1009.
250. See Richard A. Daynard & Mark Gottlieb, 18 Keys to Litigating Against Tobacco
Companies, TRIAL, Nov. 1999, at 18, 24.
251. See Barton, supra note 185, at 239.
252. See id.
253. See generally Angeletti, 358 Md. at 768-69, 752 A.2d at 244.
254. 300 Md. 555, 479 A.2d 1329 (1984).
255. /d. at 566-67, 479 A.2d at 1335.
256. /d. at 563 n.7, 479 A.2d at 1333 n.7; see also supra note 45 and accompanying
text (explaining the court's rationale in Snowden).
257. /d.
258. See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 714, 752 A.2d at 214 (citing 7B CHARLES AlAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRAcncE AND PRoCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1802, at 464
(2d ed. 1986)).
259. See supra notes 36-47 (comparing Maryland Rule 2-231 with Federal Rule 23
and noting that only Federal Rule 23 has a provision allowing interlocutory
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had never utilized a writ of mandamus to review a class action certification. 260 Other jurisdictions had done so, but courts in those cases
generally only issued the writ when there was an abuse of discretion by
the lower court, 261 the standard required for mandamus. 262 In fact,
before Angeletti, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had explicidy stated
that it would not issue a writ of mandamus for the purpose of
micromanaging complex litigation. 263 Apparendy, the court has reconsidered this statement.

2.

Abuse of Discretion

The court of appeals in Angeletti did not address whether Judge
Angeletti clearly abused his discretion in certifying the class action. In
acknowledging that Judge Angeletti deliberately and seriously exercised his discretion, the dissent suggested that the majority of the
court only opposed the result of Judge Angeletti's decision to certify.264 Certainly the petitioners were entided to an appeal on final
judgment, 265 and therefore, under Maryland statute, the petitioners
did have an adequate remedy at law. 266 While the defendants' first
opportunity to appeal certification would likely arise only after a "fully
litigated loss" by the defendants, 267 this does not mean that the defendants would not eventually have adequate relief. 268 However, in
summarizing its decision to override the preference for the final judgment rule and issue the writ of mandamus, the court stated that
"(p]etitioners have demonstrated the lack of other available, adequate
relief as well as the existence of a paramount public and judicial interest [whichjustifies] the issuance of mandamus, in order to protect the

260.
261.
262.

263.
264.
265.

appeals of class certification orders); see also Gallacher, supra note 21, at
1541.
See Gallacher, supra note 21, at 1542 n.166.
See, e.g., In reAm. Med. Sys. Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); Ex parte
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 684 So. 2d 1302 (Ala. 1996); Ex parte Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 582 So. 2d 469 (Ala. 1991).
See Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 146, 680 A.2d 1040, 1048 (1996) (stating that "judicial review is properly sought through a writ of mandamus
'where there [is] no statutory provision for hearing or review and where
public officials [are} alleged to have abused the discretionary powers reposed to
them"' (alterations in original) (emphasis added)).
See Keene Corp. v. Levin, 330 Md. 287, 294, 623 A.2d 662, 665-66 (1993).
Angeletti, 358 Md. at 799-800, 752 A.2d at 261 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
Mo. CooE ANN., CTS. & Juo. PRoc. § 12-301 (1998). This concept is referred to as the "final judgment rule," which encompasses the idea that
usually an appeal is only available on entry of a final judgment. See Huber
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 347 Md. 415, 423, 701 A.2d 415,418-19 (1997).
The policy behind this rule is that "piecemeal appeals are disfavored" as
inefficient judicial administration. Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. 611, 614, 440
A.2d 388, 389 (1982).
See Mo. CoDE ANN., CTs. &Juo. PROc. § 12-303 (1998).
See Angeletti, 358 Md. at 714, 752 A.2d at 213.
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integrity of the judicial system in this State." 269 Due to the potential
judicial diseconomy that could result from class certification, the
court of appeals ignored the abuse of discretion standard and issued
the writ based on projected expense that "both the parties and the
judicial system of this State [would] incur should the litigation proceed as a class action. "270
The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary writ and should only be
used in "the most extreme cases of discretionary abuse." 271 As such,
without any statutory guidelines allowing for review of class certification orders as interlocutory appeals, the court in Angeletti created a
unique exception in issuing this writ by narrowing the holding to "the
unique factual circumstances and procedural nature of this case." 272
Unfortunately, the filing of a motion for a writ of mandamus could
become commonplace for all similarly situated class action defendants, and this could ultimately mean that each similar class action certification essentially must be approved by the court of appeals. 273 This
process would not only usurp power from lower court judges, but such
a process would also fail to promote judicial economy by creating a
virtual two-step review of the factual issues. More importantly, after
Angeletti many judges may be hesitant to certifY even the most appropriate classes, for fear of being overruled in the same harsh manner in
which Judge Angeletti was overruled. While the court's issuance of
the writ of mandamus may effectively undermine the ability of the
trial court to certifY class actions, 274 it could also eventually result in a
decrease in the numbers of class actions certified. Additionally, after
Angeletti, only the most ineffective defendants' counsel would fail to
file a motion with the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering decertification of the class. Ultimately, a plaintiff's right to combine resources with other plaintiffs to successfully bring claims against
the tobacco companies may be at the mercy of only the bravest trial
court judges, willing to risk being overruled.
V.

CONCLUSION

While legitimate arguments exist against certifYing tobacco claims
as class actions under the current statutory standards in Maryland, 275
!d.
!d. at 722, 752 A.2d at 218.
!d. at 790, 752 A.2d at 255 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 722, 752 A.2d at 218.
See id. at 790, 752 A.2d at 255 (Cathell, J., dissenting) (speculating that the
majority's decision could result in a "yo-yo" situation in which the court of
appeals would have to approve each class action).
274. See id. at 789, 752 A.2d at 255 (stating that by not according the trial judge
the proper deference, the court of appeals undermines the judicial process,
Maryland Rule 2-231, and the final judgment rule).
275. See supra Part III (explaining the Angeletti court's rationale against
certification).
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the comprehensive manner in which the Court of Appeals of Maryland disapproved ofjudge Angeletti's certification ensures that even a
convincing argument advocating class action certification for tobacco
claims will likely fail. Mter Angeletti, the court of appeals has authority
to utilize a writ of mandamus to order decertification, even if the trial
judge has not abused his discretion in certifying the class. 276 A writ of
mandamus ordering decertification may also be utilized as a method
of appealing certification, which is not generally appealable until final
judgment in Maryland. 277 Unless Maryland enacts legislation similar
to the Federal Interlocutory Appeals Act or amends Rule 2-231 to include a provision authorizing interlocutory appeal of a certification
order, a writ of mandamus may become the new method of circumventing the final judgment rule in Maryland class action litigation.
Certainly, after Angeletti, no judge will want to undertake a grueling
pre-trial certification process only to be overturned. While only time
may tell exactly what implications Angeletti will have on Maryland law,
one message of the court of appeals is clear - Maryland courts adamantly disapprove of class certification for mass tort tobacco litigation.278 The message to potential plaintiffs is not as obvious and is
perhaps an inadvertent consequence - claims against tobacco companies are likely to be unsuccessful in Maryland, whether brought as a
class action or brought individually. 279
The court in Angeletti uses judicial economy as the measuring stick
for both its decision on the merits and for its decision to issue the writ
of mandamus. 280 A decision based on overall judicial economy may
place the court's interests in decreasing litigation above the rights of
plaintiffs to have their day in court. 281 More specifically, this decision
places the court's interest in how taxpayers' dollars are spent ahead of
the plaintiffs' interest in compensating taxpayers for their injuries. Although dockets seem perpetually crowded and the burden on taxpayers must be considered, 282 after Angeletti, perhaps the most efficient
form of justice is not justice at all.
Melodie C. Hahn
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